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SECURITIES/ADMINISTRATIVE LAW—INTERNAL 
REPORTERS WHO BLOW THE WHISTLE: ARE THEY PROTECTED 
UNDER THE DODD-FRANK ACT’S ANTI-RETALIATION 
PROVISION? 
 
Kristin Goodchild * 
 
In 2010, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street and 
Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”), which was 
a sweeping piece of legislation that required the 
implementation of new rules and regulations throughout the 
financial industry.  Interpretative ambiguity exists within the 
Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower program, which provides a 
definition of who qualifies as a whistleblower, and an anti-
retaliation provision, which is intended to protect 
whistleblowers from retaliation.  The ambiguity arises because a 
whistleblower is defined as an individual who makes a report to 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”).  
However, the anti-retaliation provision describes three 
categories of protected whistleblowing activities, one of which 
can be construed as an exception to the whistleblower 
definition since it does not require disclosure to the SEC.  The 
SEC sought to clarify this ambiguity by issuing a rule (the 
“SEC’s Rule”) explaining that retaliation protection under the 
Dodd-Frank Act extends to an individual who only reports 
possible securities law violations through his employer’s 
internal whistleblowing procedures. 
 
The Second and Fifth Circuits and several district courts have 
weighed in.  The Fifth Circuit and the minority of district courts 
have determined that there is no ambiguity and, according to 
the definition of whistleblower, an individual must report 
potential securities law violations to the SEC to receive 
retaliation protection.  The Second Circuit and a majority of 
district courts have determined that there is ambiguity and the 
SEC’s Rule is a reasonable interpretation that should be given 
deference in order to provide retaliation protection to an 
2 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1 
individual who only makes an internal report to his employer. 
 
This Note will advocate that future circuit courts of appeal and 
district courts should follow the Second Circuit and majority of 
district courts’ interpretation that the Dodd-Frank Act’s anti-
retaliation provision provides protection to employee-
whistleblowers who report possible securities law violations 
internally from the retaliatory actions of their employers, as 
internal reporting has many important benefits.  These benefits 
include: allowing a company to investigate allegations of 
misconduct and self-report violations to the SEC; assisting the 
SEC in avoiding costs associated with initiating investigations 
and enforcement actions; protecting employees who may face 
ethical dilemmas by reporting externally; and providing 
protection to loyal employees who prefer to report internally. 
By failing to protect employee-whistleblowers who report 
internally, future circuit courts of appeal and district courts will 
impair the very purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act and will 
encourage retaliation against the group of individuals who are 
the most in need of retaliation protection. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Image this scenario: You have worked for XYZ, Inc. as an 
engineer and supervisor for twelve years.1  You have always 
received positive performance reviews, have been awarded 
numerous discretionary bonuses, and have been told you are a 
valued employee.2  At one point, you learn that one of your direct 
reports is possibly embezzling from the company, which you fear 
amounts to fraud against shareholders.3  After your direct report 
refuses your directive to cease these actions, you report this 
conduct to your direct supervisor and ask that your direct report’s 
 
*   Candidate for J.D., 2016, Western New England University School of Law.  I 
would like to thank the Western New England Law Review staff for all their hard work 
throughout the editorial process.  I would also like to thank Professor René Reich-
Graefe, Western New England School of Law, for his insight, guidance, and feedback 
throughout the writing process.  Finally, to my husband and family, thank you for your 
support and patience. 
 1. See Banko v. Apple, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749, 752 (N.D. Cal. 2013).  This 
scenario was developed from the facts of the Banko case. 
2.    Id. 
3. Id.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2006 & Supp. 2009) (prohibiting securities fraud, 
including theft from investors). 
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employment be terminated.4  When your direct supervisor does 
nothing, you report these inappropriate actions and possible 
securities law violations to upper management and again ask for 
your direct report’s termination.5  Even after upper management 
finds over forty instances of misconduct, your direct report still has 
her job and you are told to stop pursuing the matter.6  Still 
believing this conduct could result in securities law violations, you 
notify the human resource department.7  Following subsequent 
meetings that you are not invited to attend, your direct report’s 
employment is terminated.8  However, upper management is angry 
that you ignored their request to leave the matter alone and went 
to human resources.9  Shortly thereafter, you receive praise for 
completing a new prototype before your holiday break.10  Upon 
your return, you receive a large discretionary bonus.11  Then, less 
than two weeks later, you are fired.12 
This is a familiar scenario faced by many employees who blow 
the whistle and report potential securities law violations to their 
employers.  These employee-whistleblowers usually face two 
reporting choices.  First, they can report the possible securities law 
violations to their employers hoping their employers will remedy 
the situation, but may very well suffer employment retaliation, such 
as altered job responsibilities or termination.13  Second, these 
employees can report the possible violations to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (the “SEC”), which tends to be the less 
favored method for employee-whistleblowers for a number of 
reasons,14 and still fear retaliation by their employers.  While the 
second category of employee-whistleblowers is explicitly protected 
from retaliation under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer 
Protection Act15 (the “Dodd-Frank Act”), it is unclear whether the 
Dodd-Frank Act also protects the first category of employee-
4.  See Banko, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 752. 
5.  Id. 
6.  Id. 
7.  Id. 
8.  Id. 
9.  Id. at 752–753. 
10.  Id. at 753. 
11.  Id. 
12.  Id. 
13.  See infra Part III.C. 
14.  See infra Parts III.A–C. 
15. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in various sections of 
Titles 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, and 42 of the United States Code). 
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whistleblowers from retaliation by their employers.  This Note will 
advocate that the Dodd-Frank Act’s anti-retaliation provision 
should be interpreted to also protect the first category of 
employee-whistleblowers from their employers’ retaliatory actions. 
In response to the financial crisis of 2008,16 Congress enacted 
the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 to overhaul the United States financial 
industry.17  At over 2,300 pages, the Dodd-Frank Act was a 
sweeping piece of legislation that required the implementation of 
over 400 new rules and regulations throughout the industry.18  
Section 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act amended the Securities 
Exchange Act of 193419 (the “Exchange Act”) by adding Section 
21F, titled “Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protection”20 
(the “Whistleblower Program”).21  The Whistleblower Program 
includes an anti-retaliation provision,22 a bounty provision,23 
provides a definition of who qualifies as a whistleblower24 (the 
“whistleblower definition”), and gives the SEC broad rulemaking 
authority in order to implement the Whistleblower Program.25 
Congress, tasked with responding to the financial crisis, was 
quick to implement the Dodd-Frank Act—and with it, the 
Whistleblower Program.  This resulted in certain definitional and 
structural ambiguities and disconnects.  As a result, there is 
interpretative ambiguity between the whistleblower definition and 
16.  FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 
390–91 (Jan. 2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/87YC-R5BW].  From 2007 to the first quarter of 2009, $17 trillion of 
household net worth was lost and, from 2007 to December 2009, 8.3 million jobs were 
lost.  Id.  The unemployment rate reached a high of 17.4% in October 2009.  Id. 
17. Recent Legislation, Corporate Law – Securities Regulation – Congress 
Expands Incentives for Whistleblowers to Report Suspected Violations to the SEC., 
124 HARV. L. REV. 1829, 1829 (2011) [hereinafter Incentives for Whistleblowers]. 
18.  Id.; Oversight of Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, COMM’N ON FIN. SERVS., 
http://financialservices.house.gov/dodd-frank/ [http://perma.cc/PD37-NED4] (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2015). 
19.  15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (2014). 
20.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2014). 
21.  Incentives for Whistleblowers, supra note 17, at 1831. 
22.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2014).  The anti-retaliation provision provides a 
private right of action to an employee-whistleblower for the retaliatory actions of his 
employer as a result of the employee’s whistleblowing activity.  Id. 
23.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b) (2014).  Under the bounty provision, an individual is 
entitled to receive an award from the SEC for providing information to the SEC that 
leads to a successful enforcement action.  Id.  The amount of the award ranges from ten 
to thirty percent of the monetary sanction collected by the SEC in an enforcement 
action against the employer.  Id. 
24.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2014). 
25.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(j) (2014). 
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the anti-retaliation provision.  The Dodd-Frank Act defines a 
whistleblower as “any individual who provides . . . information 
relating to a violation of the securities laws to the [SEC], in a 
manner established, by rule or regulation, by the [SEC].”26  On the 
other hand, the anti-retaliation provision describes three different 
categories of protected whistleblowing activities, one of which can 
be construed as an exception to the whistleblower definition since 
it does not require disclosure to the SEC.27  If this subsection of the 
anti-retaliation provision is read as an exception to the 
whistleblower definition, it could provide anti-retaliation 
protection to an employee-whistleblower who only makes an 
internal report to his employer through his employer’s internal 
whistleblowing procedures, rather than making an external 
disclosure to the SEC. 
Using its rulemaking authority,28 the SEC interpreted the anti-
retaliation provision as such.29  The SEC recently submitted amicus 
curiae briefs in Second Circuit and Third Circuit cases to support 
its interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision.30  The Second 
Circuit declined to rule on the issue31 and the Third Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s ruling that the plaintiff did not disclose 
misconduct contained within subsection (iii) of the anti-retaliation 
26.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (emphasis added). 
27.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) (2014). 
28.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(j). 
29.  17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2 (West 2015), invalidated by Asadi v. G.E. Energy 
(USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013). 
30.  Brief of the SEC, Amicus Curiae in Support of the Appellant, Safarian v. 
Am. DG Energy Inc., No. 10-6082, slip op. at 1 (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2014), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, remanded to No. 14-2734, 2015 WL 4430837 (3d Cir. July 21, 
2015) (No. 14-2734) [hereinafter Safarian Brief]; Brief of the SEC, Amicus Curiae in 
Support of the Appellant, Meng-Lin v. Siemens AG, 763 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 
13-4385) [hereinafter Meng-Lin Brief]. 
31. Meng-Lin v. Siemens AG, 763 F.3d 175, 183 (2d Cir. 2014).  Meng-Lin 
worked as a compliance officer in China for Siemens China, Ltd., a Chinese subsidiary 
of Siemens AG (collectively, “Siemens”), a German corporation listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange.  Id. at 177.  He discovered improper payments to certain North 
Korean and Chinese officials.  Id.  After he reported the improper payments to 
Siemens through its internal procedures, he was retaliated against by Siemens and 
ultimately fired.  Id.  After his termination, Meng-Lin reported the improper payments 
to the SEC.  Id.  The district court granted Siemens’ motion to dismiss on the ground 
that the Dodd-Frank Act’s anti-retaliation provision does not apply extraterritorially.  
Id. at 177–78.  On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed.  Id. at 183.  However, in a recent 
case, the Second Circuit held that there is ambiguity and the SEC’s Rule is a reasonable 
interpretation.  Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, No. 14-4626, 2015 WL 5254916, at *1, *1 
(2d Cir. Sept. 10, 2015). 
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provision.32 
Unlike the Second and Third Circuits in these cases, very 
recently, the Second Circuit, the Fifth Circuit, and several district 
courts have weighed in on the issue.  The Fifth Circuit and a 
minority of district courts in California, Colorado, Florida, 
Missouri, and Wisconsin have determined that the anti-retaliation 
provision is unambiguous and, according to the whistleblower 
definition, only protects individuals from retaliation who report 
securities law violations to the SEC.33  In contrast, the Second 
Circuit and a majority of district courts in California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Kansas, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Jersey, New 
York, and Tennessee have found that the anti-retaliation provision 
is ambiguous.34  These courts held that either, on its face, the anti-
32.  Safarian v. Am. DG Energy Inc., No. 10-6082, slip op. at 1 (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 
2014).  Safarian worked as an engineer for American DG Energy, Inc. (“American”), a 
utility company.  Id. at 1.  He reported overbilling, improper construction, and failure 
to obtain necessary permits to American.  Id.  Safarian’s employment was later 
terminated.  Id.  The district court granted American’s motion for summary judgment, 
in part, because Safarian failed to disclose any misconduct listed in subsection (iii) of 
the anti-retaliation provision.  Id. at 1, 4.  The district court noted that it did not need to 
decide whether Safarian’s failure to make a report to the SEC precluded his claim.  Id. 
at 4.  The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling on the Dodd-Frank Act 
issue, but vacated the court’s ruling on other issues and remanded for further 
proceedings.  Safarian v. Am. DG Energy Inc., No. 14-2734, 2015 WL 4430837 at *1, *3 
(3d Cir. July 21, 2015). 
33. See Lutzeier v. Citigroup Inc., 305 F.D.R. 107, 110 (E.D. Mo. 2015); 
Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 640, 646 (E.D. Wis. 2014); Asadi v. 
G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 630 (5th Cir. 2013); Englehart v. Career 
Educ. Corp., No. 8:14-cv-444-T-33EAJ, 2014 WL 2619501, at *1, *7 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 
2014); Banko v. Apple, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749, 756 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Wagner v. Bank 
of Am. Corp., No. 12-cv-00381-RBJ, 2013 WL 3786643, at *1, *5 (D. Colo. 2013); see 
also infra Part II.C.1. 
34. See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, No. 14-4626, 2015 WL 5254916, at *1, *9 
(2d Cir. Sept. 10, 2015); Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., No. C-14-5180 EMC, 2015 WL 
4483955, at *1, *12 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2015), appeal filed No. 15-80136, 2015 WL 
4483955 (9th Cir. July 31, 2015); Connolly v. Remkes, No. 5:14-CV-01344-LHK, 2014 
WL 5473144, at *1, *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014); Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. 
Supp. 3d 719, 732–33 (D. Neb. 2014); Yang v. Navigators Grp., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 519, 
534 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., No. 13-4149 
(SDW)(MCA), slip op. 1, 6 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2014); Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters 
(Mkts.) LLC, 984 F. Supp. 2d 141, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 977 
F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D. Mass. 2013); Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5914(JMF), 
2013 WL 2190084, at *1, *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2014); Genberg v. Porter, 935 F. Supp. 
2d 1094, 1106 (D. Colo. 2013); Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp., No. 3:11cv1424 (SRU), 2012 
WL 4444820, at *1, *4–*5 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012); Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, 
Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (M.D. Tenn. 2012); Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 
Civ. 8202(LBS), 2011 WL 1672066, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011); see also infra Part 
II.C.2.  It is interesting to note that there is a split in the district courts in California and 
Colorado. 
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retaliation provision protects individuals who only make internal 
reports,35 or the SEC’s construction of the anti-retaliation provision 
(the “SEC’s Rule” or the “Rule”)36 is a reasonable interpretation 
and should be given deference.37  Thus, the majority of courts 
currently believe that employee-whistleblowers who report 
securities law violations through their employer’s internal 
whistleblowing procedures should also be protected from 
retaliation pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act’s anti-retaliation 
provision.38 
This Note will argue that future district courts and circuit 
courts of appeal should adopt the SEC and majority of courts’ view 
that the anti-retaliation provision is ambiguous and should give the 
SEC’s Rule deference in order to protect employee-whistleblowers 
who only report securities law violations internally from the 
retaliatory actions of their respective employers.  The SEC’s Rule 
35. See Bussing, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 732–33; Yang, 18 F. Supp. 3d at 534; Genberg, 
935 F. Supp. 2d at 1106; Nollner, 852 F. Supp. 2d at 994; Egan, 2011 WL 1672066, at *1; 
see also infra Part II.C.2.b. 
36.  The SEC’s Rule provides as follows: 
For purposes of the anti-retaliation protections afforded by [the anti-
retaliation provision] . . . you are a whistleblower if: (i) You possess a 
reasonable belief that the information you are providing relates to a possible 
securities law violation . . . that has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur, 
and; (ii) You provide that information in a manner described in [subsections 
(i)-(iii) of the anti-retaliation provision’s protected activities] . . . . (iii) The 
anti-retaliation protections apply whether or not you satisfy the requirements, 
procedures and conditions to qualify for an award. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(1) (West 2015), invalidated by Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), 
L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013). 
37. See Berman, 2015 WL 5254916, at *1; Somers, 2015 WL 4483955, at *13; 
Connolly, 2014 WL 5473144, at *6; Khazin, No. 13-4149 (SDW)(MCA), slip op. at 6; 
Rosenblum, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 147; Ellington, 977 F. Supp. 2d at 45; Murray, 2013 WL 
2190084, at *7; Kramer, 2012 WL 4444820, at *4–5; see also infra Part II.C.2.a. 
38. See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, No. 14-4626, 2015 WL 5254916, at *1, *9 
(2d Cir. Sept. 10, 2015); Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., No. C-14-5180 EMC, 2015 WL 
4483955, at *1, *12 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2015), appeal filed No. 15-80136, 2015 WL 
4483955 (9th Cir. July 31, 2015); Connolly v. Remkes, No. 5:14-CV-01344-LHK, 2014 
WL 5473144, at *1, *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014); Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. 
Supp. 3d 719, 732–33 (D. Neb. 2014); Yang v. Navigators Grp., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 519, 
534 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., No. 13-4149 
(SDW)(MCA), slip op. 1, 6 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2014); Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters 
(Mkts.) LLC, 984 F. Supp. 2d 141, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 977 
F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D. Mass. 2013); Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5914(JMF), 
2013 WL 2190084, at *1, *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2014); Genberg v. Porter, 935 F. Supp. 
2d 1094, 1106 (D. Colo. 2013); Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp., No. 3:11cv1424 (SRU), 2012 
WL 4444820, at *1, *4–*5 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012); Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, 
Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (M.D. Tenn. 2012); Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 
Civ. 8202(LBS), 2011 WL 1672066, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011). 
8 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1 
and its interpretation of the Dodd-Frank Act’s anti-retaliation 
provision is in line with the SEC’s enforcement objectives; will 
encourage employees to report internally through their employers’ 
whistleblowing procedures; and will protect such employees from 
retaliation by their employers.39  Further, it will obviate the need 
for employees to acquire expert legal advice before engaging in 
whistleblowing in order to determine which available 
whistleblowing activity provides the maximum retaliation 
protection. 
Internal reporting using a company’s whistleblower 
procedures is a useful tool that allows a company to investigate 
allegations of misconduct and self-report violations to the SEC.40 
Self-reporting violations of corporate misconduct is important to a 
company’s long-term reputation in the marketplace and allows the 
SEC to impose reduced fines and sanctions.41  Self-reporting is also 
beneficial to the SEC, since the SEC will not need to incur the costs 
associated with initiating a hostile investigation and enforcement 
proceeding against a company.42  In particular, the SEC is 
understaffed to investigate potential misconduct solely on its own 
initiative.43 
Further, employees and corporate officers are subject to 
certain fiduciary duties or hold professional designations in which 
they are required to adhere to certain confidentiality and ethical 
rules to act in the best interests of their clients and/or employers.44  
39.  Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 30, at 18–20. 
40.  See Norman D. Bishara et al., The Mouth of Truth, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 37, 
40 (2013); see also infra Part III.B. 
41. See Bishara et al., supra note 40; see also Elletta Sangrey Callahan et al., 
Integrating Trends in Whistleblowing and Corporate Governance: Promoting 
Organizational Effectiveness, Societal Responsibility, and Employee Empowerment, 
20 AM. BUS. L.J. 177, 191 (2002). 
42. Terry Morehead Dworkin, Whistleblowing, MNCS, and Peace, 35 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 457, 463 (2002); Bishara, supra note 40, at 39. 
43. “Governments, strapped for resources, facing shrinking budgets, global 
competitive pressures to liberalized trade, and corporate regulatory resistance, are 
increasingly experimenting with approaches that rely on organizations themselves to 
complement standard-setting and enforcement activities.”  Orly Lobel, Lawyering 
Loyalties: Speech Rights and Duties Within Twenty-First-Century New Governance, 
77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245, 1267 (2009). 
44. Leonard M. Baynes, Just Pucker and Blow?: An Analysis of Corporate 
Whistleblowers, the Duty of Care, the Duty of Loyalty, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 76 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 875, 883 (2002); see CFA INST., CODE OF ETHICS & STANDARDS 
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § III (2014), http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/10.2469/ 
ccb.v2014.n6.1 [http://perma.cc/KEY2-K9YT]; AM. INST. OF CPAS, AICPA CODE OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 5-7 or §0.300.060.020-.070 (2015), http://www.aicpa.org/ 
Research/Standards/CodeofConduct/DownloadableDocuments/2014December15Cont
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These employees face ethical dilemmas without a clear prevailing 
regulatory mandate that they are not to fear retaliation for only 
reporting internally.  In addition, employee-whistleblowers tend to 
be long-term employees who feel loyal to their respective 
employers and believe the internal reporting of misconduct is in the 
companies’ best interests.45  As such, these employee-
whistleblowers prefer to report misconduct internally first and most 
often turn to external reporting only when they fear retaliation by 
their employers.46 
In order to better understand the more inclusive treatment of 
whistleblowers under the SEC’s Rule, Part I of this Note will 
provide a brief history of the creation of the SEC and its mission 
and strategic goals; the shifting public policy regarding 
whistleblowing; and a brief examination of a previously 
implemented securities law whistleblower statute and its failure to 
adequately protect whistleblowers seeking its protection.  Part II 
will discuss the implementation and scope of the Dodd-Frank Act; 
the SEC’s Rule; the Fifth Circuit and minority courts’ view that the 
anti-retaliation provision is unambiguous and requires reporting to 
the SEC in order to receive protection from retaliation; the Second 
Circuit and majority courts’ view that the anti-retaliation provision 
is ambiguous and should be construed as an exception to the 
whistleblower definition in order to provide retaliation protection 
to employee-whistleblowers who report securities law violations 
internally; and the SEC’s interpretation that the anti-retaliation 
provision also provides protection to employee-whistleblowers who 
only make internal reports to their employers.  Part III begins with 
a consideration of the confidentiality and ethical obligations of 
employees holding professional designations and corporate 
officers’ fiduciary duties; the benefits advanced by protecting 
internal reporters, including company incentives for self-reporting 
violations of misconduct; employer behavior towards employee-
whistleblowers and employee loyalty; and, finally, public policy 
considerations. 
I. CREATION OF THE SEC AND PREVIOUS SECURITIES LAW 
entAsof2015April23CodeofConduct.pdf [http://perma.cc/TK4X-62R8].  See also infra 
Part III.A. 
45. Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model to Encourage 
Corporate Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1142 (2006).  See infra Part III.C. 
46.  Callahan et al., supra note 41, at 195; Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by 
the Bounties?  The Attempt to Reform Wall Street by the New Whistleblower 
Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 2012 BYU L. REV. 73, 110–19 (2012). 
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WHISTLEBLOWER STATUTE 
A. SEC: Its History, Mission, and Strategic Objectives 
Prior to the stock market crash in 1929, little federal regulation 
of the securities markets existed.47  Following the end of World 
War I in 1918,48 there was a surge of investment activity as small to 
large investors, inspired by “rags to riches” stories and readily 
available credit, set out to make their fortunes in the stock 
market.49  After the stock market crashed in October 1929, nearly 
half of the $50 billion of new securities offered since the end of 
World War I became worthless, causing investors and the banks 
that loaned to those investors to lose great sums of money.50  As a 
result, public confidence in the securities markets deteriorated.51 
It was agreed that, in order for the economy to recover, public 
confidence in the securities markets needed to be restored and 
maintained.52  After hearings to identify problems and solutions, 
Congress passed the Securities Act of 193353 (the “Securities Act”) 
and the Exchange Act54 in an effort to restore investor confidence 
in the securities markets, provide investors and the markets with 
reliable information, and establish rules regarding honest dealing.55  
Together, the Securities Act and the Exchange Act created the 
SEC to “enforce the newly-passed securities laws, to promote 
stability in the markets and, most importantly, to protect 
investors.”56 
The SEC’s mission “is to protect investors, maintain fair, 
orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”57  
To achieve its mission, the SEC seeks to establish and maintain an 
47.  The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market 
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml [http://perma.cc/4EXZ-6UGM] (last visited 
Sept. 21, 2015) [hereinafter Investor’s Advocate]. 
48.  World War I History, HIST., http://www.history.com/topics/world-war-
i/world-war-i-history [http://perma.cc/S9EF-GL8T](last visited Sept. 21, 2015). 
49.  Investor’s Advocate, supra note 47. 
50.  Id. 
51.  Id. 
52.  Id. 
53.  15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (2014). 
54.  15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (2014). 
55.  Investor’s Advocate, supra note 47. 
56.  Id. 
57.  U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, STRATEGIC PLAN FISCAL YEARS 2014–2018 
3 (2014), http://www.sec.gov/about/sec-strategic-plan-2014-2018.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/V6P6-GJKL]. 
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effective regulatory framework, promote and enforce compliance 
with the securities laws, and facilitate investor access to 
information necessary to make informed investment decisions.58  
The SEC strives to promote quality disclosure to prevent abusive 
practices, to ensure capital markets operate in a fair, efficient, and 
transparent fashion, to ensure market participants understand and 
comply with their obligations under the federal securities laws, to 
detect and deter federal securities law violations, and to hold 
federal securities law violators accountable for their actions.59  To 
help administer the Whistleblower Program and to further the 
SEC’s mission, the SEC established the Office of the 
Whistleblower (the “OWB”) to assist in identifying and stopping 
fraud quickly and early thus minimizing investor losses.60 
B. Securities Law Whistleblower Statute Before the Dodd-Frank 
Act 
Whistleblowing has a long history dating back to when Venice 
was a city-state between the seventh and eighteenth centuries.61  In 
order to expose and deter official misconduct, in particular to 
curtail tax evasion and increase city-state security, the government 
of Venice established a system for citizens to provide anonymous 
reports regarding misconduct.62  Citizens would insert reports of 
official misconduct into the carved head of a lion statue sitting 
outside a government building.63 
Since then, public policy regarding whistleblowing has shifted 
from almost exclusively relying on external whistleblowing to also 
encouraging internal whistleblowing as regulators seek to end 
wrongdoing rather than to strictly punish a company.64  Internal 
58.  Id. at 5–6. 
59.  Id. at 5. 
60.  U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON 
THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 4 (2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/annual-report-2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/N5K5-
S4XQ] [hereinafter 2014 Annual Report]. 
61.  Bishara et al., supra note 40, at 39.  The history of Venice as a city-state dates 
back to the sixth century and continued until the eighteenth century when Napoleon 
and his army forced Venice to adopt a pro-French democratic government.  Robert 
Wilde, Venice: The History of Venice, Italy, ABOUT EDUC., 
http://europeanhistory.about.com/od/italyandthecitystates/a/venice.htm 
[http://perma.cc/S53H-HYAV] (last visited Sept. 22, 2015). 
62.  Bishara, supra note 40, at 38 & n.2. 
63.  Id. at 39. 
64.  Dworkin, supra note 42.  “With recent scandals in both the private and public 
sectors being exposed by internal whistleblowers, courts emphasize that ‘[p]ublic policy 
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whistleblowing is seen as an effective tool in deterring corporate 
misconduct and often reveals misconduct long before a 
governmental agency or external party would be able to discover 
it.65  It also promotes corporate self-monitoring, is less harmful to 
the company, is more ethical since external reporting can be seen 
as disloyal, and saves regulatory agency resources by reducing 
investigating and monitoring costs.66 
Following corporate scandals such as Enron67 and Worldcom,68 
Congress, in its pursuit to combat and deter fraud in the securities 
markets and promote internal whistleblowing, enacted the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”).69  SOX was enacted to foster 
investor confidence by “improving the accuracy and reliability of 
corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws”70 and 
by providing more publicly available information on companies to 
assist investors in making informed investment decisions.71  It also 
signified Congress’ “new approach to regulation that relies on 
internal monitoring [and internal] reporting.”72 
SOX established a civil cause of action for whistleblowers who 
suffered retaliatory actions by their employers and criminalized 
favors the exposure of crime, and the cooperation of citizens possessing knowledge 
thereof is essential to effective implementation of that policy.’”  Lobel, supra note 43, 
at 1251 (quoting Joiner v. Benton Cmty. Bank, 411 N.E.2d 229, 231 (Il. 1980)). 
65.  Bishara, supra note 40. 
66.  Id. at 39–40; Dworkin, supra note 42, at 463 & n.43. 
67. A former Enron employee discovered accounting violations in which she 
believed Enron was using its own company stock to generate gains and losses on its 
income statement.  Baynes, supra note 44, at 877.  Days before Enron was to announce 
a huge third quarter loss, its external auditors warned Enron officials that its public 
explanation for the loss was potentially misleading.  Id. at 880.  On October 16, 2001, 
Enron announced a $618 million loss.  Id.  The SEC initiated an investigation and 
determined that since 1997 Enron had overstated its earnings by approximately $586 
million.  Id.  Enron subsequently filed for bankruptcy in December 2001.  Id. 
68. Worldcom once operated “the world’s largest Internet network.”  Lusia 
Beltran, Worldcom filed largest bankruptcy ever, CNNMONEY (July 22, 2002, 10:35 
AM), http://money.cnn.com/2002/07/19/news/worldcom_bankruptcy/ 
[http://perma.cc/S53H-HYAV].  In 1999, business began to decline.  Id.  Questions 
arose surrounding allegations that the company incorrectly accounted for $3.8 billion in 
operating expenses and $366 million in personal loans made to the CEO.  Id.  
Worldcom filed for bankruptcy in 2002.  Id.  At the time, “Worldcom’s bankruptcy 
[was] the largest in United States history.”  Id. 
69.  Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1514A) (amended 2015 not yet published); Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled 
Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely 
Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 67 (2007). 
70.  116 Stat. 745. 
71.  See Baynes, supra note 44, at 890. 
72.  Lobel, supra note 43, at 1251. 
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retaliation.73  SOX was intended “to motivate employees to blow 
the whistle by providing employees who make complaints with 
protection from employer retaliation in the workplace.”74  It also 
required public companies to establish policies and procedures for 
anonymous employee disclosures of misconduct to the boards of 
directors.75 
To receive protection under SOX, an employee must assist in 
an investigation by Congress, a federal agency, a supervisor, or 
anyone the employer authorizes to conduct an investigation.76  If 
the employee suffers retaliation, the employee has 180 days to file a 
claim with the Secretary of Labor (the “Secretary”).77  The 
Secretary has 180 days to issue a final order, but, if the Secretary 
fails to issue the final order within 180 days, the employee can bring 
a civil claim in a federal district court.78 
However, SOX has failed to protect a great majority of 
employees who have sought its protection.79  During the first three 
years after SOX’s enactment in 2002, 491 employees filed claims.80  
The Department of Labor (“DoL”) resolved 361 of these claims 
and found in favor of the employees in only thirteen cases or 3.6% 
of the time.81  Ninety-three of these claims were appealed to an 
Administrative Law Judge in the DoL, who found in favor of the 
employee in six cases or 6.5% of the time.82  Further, between 2005 
and 2011 only ten employees succeeded in their SOX claims.83  To 
put these statistics in perspective, from SOX’s enactment in 2002 
until the end of 2011, a total of 1,260 claims were decided by the 
DoL and employees succeeded only 1.8% of the time.84  
Additionally, between 2006 and 2008 the DoL did not decide any 
73. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b) (2013) (civil action); 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (2013) 
(criminal penalty); Rapp, supra note 46, at 82. 
74.  Rapp, supra note 46, at 82. 
75.  15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4)(B) (2014); Baynes, supra note 44, at 890. 
76.  18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2013); Baynes, supra note 44, at 890. 
77.  18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D) (2013); Baynes, supra note 44, at 890. 
78.  18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(B) (2013); Baynes, supra note 44, at 890.  Remedies 
available under SOX include compensatory damages (such as reinstatement and back 
pay with interest) and special damages (such as litigation costs and attorneys’ fees).  18 
U.S.C. § 1514A(c) (2013); Baynes, supra note 44, at 890. 
79.  Moberly, supra note 69. 
80.  Id. 
81.  Id. 
82.  Id. 
83. Richard Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower Provisions: Ten Years 
Later, 64 S.C. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (2012). 
84.  Id. at 29. 
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case in favor of an employee.85  One of the reasons for the low 
employee success rate is that the DoL and the Administrative Law 
Judges frequently found that the employee violated a procedural 
rule or did not meet the then ninety-day statute of limitations to 
file their claims.86  These figures illustrate that SOX has failed to 
fulfill its purpose of providing adequate anti-retaliation 
protection.87  They further illustrate that when whistleblowing 
occurs, retaliation happens, and SOX anti-retaliation protection 
does not work as well as it should. 
II. IMPLEMENTATION AND SCOPE OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT, 
SEC’S RULE, AND CONFLICT BETWEEN THE WHISTLEBLOWER 
DEFINITION AND THE ANTI-RETALIATION PROVISION 
A. Implementation and Scope of the Whistleblower Program 
In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, Congress enacted 
the Dodd-Frank Act “[t]o promote the financial stability of the 
United States by improving accountability and transparency in the 
financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American 
taxpayer by ending bailouts, [and] to protect consumers from 
abusive financial services practices . . . .”88  The Dodd-Frank Act is 
considered “‘the first comprehensive statute of national scope’ 
protecting corporate whistleblowers.”89  Congress sought to protect 
and encourage individuals to report possible securities law 
violations by enacting the Whistleblower Program as part of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, which includes the whistleblower definition, the 
anti-retaliation provision, and the bounty provision.90 
The Whistleblower Program91 defines a whistleblower as “any 
individual who provides . . . information relating to a violation of 
the securities laws to the [SEC], in a manner established, by rule or 
85.  Id. 
86.  Moberly, supra note 69, at 71.  At the time of publication of this article, the 
SOX statute of limitations was ninety days.  When SOX was amended in 2010, the 
statute of limitations was increased to 180 days.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D) 
(2013). 
87.  Moberly, supra note 69, at 74. 
88.  Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010) (codified in 
scattered sections of Titles 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, and 42 of the United States Code); 
Incentives for Whistleblowers, supra note 17. 
89. Incentives for Whistleblowers, supra note 17 (quoting Robert G. Vaugh, 
American’s First Comprehensive Statute Protecting Corporate Whistleblowers, 57 
ADMIN. L. REV 1, 4 (2005)). 
90.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2014). 
91.  Id. 
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regulation, by the [SEC].”92  The anti-retaliation provision affords 
an individual with a private right of action against his employer for 
retaliatory actions.93  The anti-retaliation provision provides that: 
[n]o employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, 
harass, directly or indirectly, or in any manner discriminate 
against, a whistleblower in the terms and conditions of 
employment because of any lawful act done by the 
whistleblower— 
(i) in providing information to the [SEC] in accordance 
with this section; 
(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in an 
investigation or judicial or administrative action of the 
[SEC] based upon or related to such information; or 
(iii) in making disclosures that are required or protected 
under [SOX] . . . and any other law, rule, or regulation 
subject to the jurisdiction of the [SEC].94 
(Subsections (i)–(iii) will hereinafter be referred to as the 
“protected activities.”)  The bounty provision provides that: 
[i]n any covered judicial or administrative action, or related 
action, the [SEC], under regulations prescribed by the [SEC] 
and subject to subsection (c), shall pay an award or awards to 1 
or more whistleblowers who voluntarily provide original 
information to the [SEC] that led to the successful enforcement 
of the covered judicial or administrative action, or related 
action, in an aggregate amount equal to— 
(A) not less than 10 percent, in total, of what has been 
collected of the monetary sanctions imposed in the action 
or related actions; and 
(B) not more than 30 percent, in total, of what has been 
collected of the monetary sanctions imposed in the action 
or related actions.95 
To ensure its purpose under the Whistleblower Program was 
achieved, Congress authorized the SEC to establish rules and 
regulations to implement the Whistleblower Program.96  As such, to 
assist in its administration of the Whistleblower Program, the SEC 
established the OWB.97 
92.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2014). 
93.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2014). 
94.  Id. 
95.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1) (2014). 
96.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(j) (2014). 
97.  2014 Annual Report, supra note 60. 
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B. SEC’s Rule 
Pursuant to its rulemaking authority under the Dodd-Frank 
Act,98 the SEC issued Rule 21F-2(b), which provides in part: 
(1) For purposes of the anti-retaliation protections afforded by 
[the anti-retaliation provision], you are a whistleblower if: . . . 
(i) You possess a reasonable belief that the information you are 
providing relates to a possible securities law violation . . . that 
has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur, and; 
(ii) You provide that information in a manner described in 
[subsections (i)-(iii) of the anti-retaliation provision’s protected 
activities]. 
(iii) The anti-retaliation protections apply whether or not you 
satisfy the requirements, procedures and conditions to qualify 
for an award.99 
In issuing its Rule, the SEC sought to clarify an ambiguity in 
the Dodd-Frank Act’s anti-retaliation provision by directly stating 
that anti-retaliation protection extends to an individual who 
engages in whistleblowing activity described in subsection (iii) of 
the anti-retaliation provision’s protected activities regardless of 
whether the individual also makes an external report to the SEC.100 
 
C. Root of the Problem: How to Interpret Subsection (iii) of the 
Anti-Retaliation Provision’s Protected Activities 
Conflict exists among the SEC, various district courts, and the 
Second and Fifth Circuits as to whether subsection (iii) of the anti-
retaliation provision’s protected activities affords an exception to 
the whistleblower definition.  The conflict arises because the Dodd-
Frank Act seems to create a “two-tiered structure of [anti-
retaliation] protection[] where potential whistleblowers receive 
different sets of protections depending on whether they choose to 
report internally or externally.”101  For example, if an employee-
whistleblower makes an external report of misconduct to the SEC, 
then the employee-whistleblower is protected under subsection (i) 
of the anti-retaliation provision’s protected activities since the 
98.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(j). 
99.  17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b) (West 2015), invalidated by Asadi v. G.E. Energy 
(USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013). 
100. Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 30, at 1. 
101.  See Incentives for Whistleblowers, supra note 17, at 1834. 
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disclosure was made directly to the SEC.102  If that same employee-
whistleblower only makes an internal report through his 
employer’s internal procedures, then that employee-whistleblower 
may not be protected under the anti-retaliation provision, unless 
the employee-whistleblower’s disclosure is protected under 
subsection (iii) of the anti-retaliation provision’s protected 
activities.103 
The question becomes: what type of anti-retaliation protection 
does subsection (iii) provide to an employee-whistleblower who 
makes an internal report to his employer pursuant to SOX, if SOX 
requires companies to establish policies and procedures for internal 
employee disclosures of misconduct?104  This question illustrates 
the ambiguity that arises between the whistleblower definition, 
which specifically states that in order to be a whistleblower 
disclosure needs to be made to the SEC,105 and subsection (iii) of 
the anti-retaliation provision’s protected activities, which 
contemplates disclosures made pursuant to SOX.106  The same 
ambiguity arises if the employee-whistleblower makes an internal 
report through his employer’s procedures and also makes a 
concurrent disclosure to the SEC, of which the employer is 
unaware.107  
  1.  Minority View: The Anti-Retaliation Provision is 
Unambiguous and Requires Reporting to the SEC to 
Receive Protection 
The Fifth Circuit was the first circuit court of appeals to weigh 
in on this issue.  In Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., the Fifth 
Circuit held that the whistleblower definition is unambiguous and 
requires an individual to make a report to the SEC in order to 
qualify as a whistleblower and receive protection under the anti-
retaliation provision.108  Along with the Fifth Circuit, five district 
courts—in California, Colorado, Florida, Missouri, and 
Wisconsin—have also determined that the anti-retaliation 
102.  Id. 
103.  Id. 
104.  15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4)(B) (2014). 
105.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2014). 
106.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) (2014). 
107.  “[T]his potential circumvention of internal reporting could have vast costs 
and indeed could undermine the very goal that [the Whistleblower Program] was 
enacted to promote–the effective and efficient detection of securities law violations.”  
Incentives for Whistleblowers, supra note 17, at 1835. 
108.  720 F.3d 620, 629 (5th Cir. 2013). 
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provision is unambiguous and requires reporting to the SEC.109 
In making its determination, the minority of courts have relied 
on the principles of statutory construction.110  When issues of 
statutory construction arise, there is a series of steps that a court 
should take to determine the meaning of a statute.111  Step one is to 
determine if the statutory language is ambiguous.112  If the statutory 
language is plain and unambiguous, the statute must be applied 
according to its terms.113  “The plainness or ambiguity of statutory 
language is determined by reference to the language itself, the 
specific context in which that language is used, and the broader 
context of the statute as a whole.”114  In construing the statutory 
language, a court should give effect to every word and provision, 
when possible, and interpret provisions in a manner that renders 
them compatible and not contradictory.115  “If the statutory text is 
unambiguous, the inquiry begins and ends with the text.”116 
If the statute is ambiguous, step two in the analysis is to 
determine if the agency’s interpretation warrants judicial 
deference.117  In making this determination, a court must apply 
another two-step process established in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.118  The first step of the 
109.  Lutzeier v. Citigroup Inc., 305 F.R.D. 107, 110 (E.D. Mo. 2015) (stating that 
the plain language of the anti-retaliation provision demonstrates a whistleblower must 
report to the SEC to qualify for protection); Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 65 F. 
Supp. 3d 640, 646 (E.D. Wis. 2014) (stating that the plain language of Congress should 
be given full effect); Englehart v. Career Educ. Corp., No. 8:14-cv-444-T-33EAJ, 2014 
WL 2619501, at *1, *7 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2014) (stating that Congress intended 
whistleblower protection to apply only to an individual who meets the whistleblower 
definition); Banko v. Apple, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749, 756 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (stating that 
the Whistleblower Program is unambiguous and only available to an individual who 
meets the whistleblower definition); Wagner v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 12-cv-00381-
RBJ, 2013 WL 3786643, at *1, *5 (D. Colo. July 19, 2013) (stating that the third 
protected activity described in the anti-retaliation provision only applies to a 
whistleblower as defined in the whistleblower definition). 
110. Lutzeier, 305 F.R.D. at 110 (agreeing with the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning); 
Asadi, 720 F.3d at 623 (explaining statutory construction analysis by the court); 
Englehart, 2014 WL 2619501, at *7–*8 (explaining statutory construction analysis); 
Banko, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 755–758 (applying rules of statutory construction); Wagner, 
2013 WL 3786643, at *4 (stating claim fails as a matter of statutory construction). 
111.  Banko, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 755. 
112.  Id. 
113.  Id. (citation omitted). 
114.  Id. (citation omitted). 
115.  Asadi, 720 F.3d at 622 (citation omitted). 
116.  Banko, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 755 (citation omitted). 
117.  Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters (Mkts.) LLC, 984 F. Supp. 2d 141, 147 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
118.  Id.; Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
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Chevron analysis is to inquire as to whether Congress has spoken 
directly on the issue.119  If Congress’s intent is clear, then a court 
and the agency must give effect to the express intent of Congress.120  
However, if Congress has not directly spoken on the issue, then the 
second step is to determine whether the agency’s interpretation is a 
permissible construction of the statute.121  “If the agency[’s] 
interpretation is reasonable, then [a court] must defer to it.”122  
Thus, if ambiguity exists between Congress’s definition of 
whistleblower and subsection (iii) of the protected activities, and 
the SEC’s Rule is a reasonable interpretation, then the SEC’s Rule 
should stand. 
Applying these principles, the Fifth Circuit determined that its 
analysis ended with the statute.123  A whistleblower is defined as 
“any individual who provides . . . information relating to a violation 
of the securities laws to the [SEC], in a manner established, by rule 
or regulation, by the [SEC].”124  The Fifth Circuit concluded that 
the whistleblower definition, on its own, is unambiguous and 
requires that an individual make a report to the SEC in order to 
qualify as a whistleblower.125 
(1984).  In Chevron, the Supreme Court considered whether the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) regulation using the bubble concept was based on a 
reasonable construction of the term “stationary source” as used in the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1977 (the “Clean Air Act”).  Id. at 840.  The Supreme Court reversed 
on the grounds that the court of appeals misconstrued the nature of its role in 
reviewing the regulation.  Id. at 841–45, 865.  Using the principles of statutory 
construction, the Supreme Court determined that the Clean Air Act did not reference 
the bubble concept, nor did it contain a specific definition of stationary source.  Id. at 
842–45.  Since Congress did not specifically speak to the issue, the Supreme Court next 
reviewed the legislative history, which also did not specifically address the issue.  Id. at 
851.  The Supreme Court then turned to the EPA’s regulation stating that as long as it 
was a reasonable interpretation of Congress’s mandate, then the regulation was entitled 
to deference.  Id. at 865.  “[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making 
responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the 
incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments.”  Id.  Thus, 
the Supreme Court held that the EPA’s use of the bubble concept was a permissible 
construction of the statute and should be given deference.  Id. at 865–66. 
119.  Rosenblum, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 147. 
120.  Id. 
121.  Id. 
122. Id. (quoting Kar Onn Lee v. Holder, 701 F.3d 931, 936 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(second alteration in original)).  The Supreme Court has “long recognized that 
considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department’s construction of a 
statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle[s] of deference to 
administrative interpretations.”  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
123.  Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 623 (5th Cir. 2013). 
124.  Id.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2014). 
125.  Asadi, 720 F.3d at 623. 
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Asadi conceded that he did not qualify as a whistleblower 
under the whistleblower definition because he did not provide 
information to the SEC.126  Instead, he argued that subsection (iii) 
of the anti-retaliation provision’s protected activities should be 
construed to protect an individual who makes an internal disclosure 
to his employer, even if the individual does not also report to the 
SEC, because there is a conflict between the whistleblower 
definition and subsection (iii).127  However, the Fifth Circuit stated 
that this perceived conflict rested on a misreading of the 
Whistleblower Program.128 
The Fifth Circuit explained that there is only one category of 
whistleblower: an “individual[] who provide[s] information relating 
to a securities law violation to the SEC;”129 whereas the protected 
activities listed in the anti-retaliation provision represent 
whistleblower protection claims.130  The Fifth Circuit stated that the 
text of these three protected activities is unambiguous and, as such, 
subsection (iii) protects a whistleblower who makes a “disclosure[] 
that [is] required or protected under [SOX and] any [other] law, 
rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC.”131 
Asadi stated he was not arguing that the language of 
subsection (iii) itself was ambiguous, but that subsection (iii) 
conflicts with the whistleblower definition.132  He reasoned that an 
individual could make a disclosure that falls within subsection (iii), 
but if the individual does not also make a report to the SEC, he 
would not be considered a whistleblower under the whistleblower 
definition.133  Asadi argued that such a reading of the anti-
retaliation provision would make subsection (iii) superfluous.134 
The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument stating that there 
would only be a conflict if the three categories of protected 
activities outlined in subsection (iii) were read as additional 
definitions of the term “whistleblower.”135  The Fifth Circuit stated 
that such a construction of the anti-retaliation provision was not 
126.  Id. at 624. 
127.  Id. 
128.  Id. at 625. 
129.  Id.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2014). 
130.  Asadi, 720 F.3d at 625. 
131.  Id.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2014). 
132.  Asadi, 720 F.3d at 626. 
133.  Id. 
134.  Id. 
135.  Id. 
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supported by the structure of the Whistleblower Program.136  
Congress specifically used the term “whistleblower” in the anti-
retaliation provision rather than the terms “individual” or 
“employee.”137  The Fifth Circuit reasoned that, since the 
whistleblower definition clearly defines who qualifies as a 
whistleblower, the definition must be given effect and there can be 
no alternative definitions.138 
The Fifth Circuit also stated that the interplay between the 
whistleblower definition and subsection (iii) of the anti-retaliation 
provision’s protected activities does not render subsection (iii) 
superfluous.139  The Fifth Circuit reasoned that subsection (iii) 
“protects whistleblowers from retaliation, based not on the 
individual’s disclosure of information to the SEC but, instead, on 
that individual’s other possible required or protected 
disclosure(s).”140 
To illustrate this point, the Fifth Circuit provided the following 
hypothetical: 
Assume a mid-level manager discovers a securities law 
violation.  On the day he makes this discovery, he immediately 
reports this securities law violation (1) to his company’s chief 
executive officer (“CEO”) and (2) to the SEC.  Unfortunately 
for the mid-level manager, the CEO, who is not yet aware of 
the disclosure to the SEC, immediately fires the mid-level 
manager.  The mid-level manager, clearly a “whistleblower” as 
defined in Dodd-Frank because he provided information to the 
SEC relating to a securities law violation, would be unable to 
prove that he was retaliated against because of the report to the 
SEC.  Accordingly, the first and second category of protected 
activity would not shield this whistleblower from retaliation.  
The third category of protected activity, however, protects the 
mid-level manager.  In this scenario, the internal disclosure to 
the CEO, a person with supervisory authority over the mid-
level manager, is protected under . . . [SOX].  Accordingly, even 
though the CEO was not aware of the report to the SEC at the 
time he terminated the mid-level manager, the mid-level 
136. Id. 
137. Id.  The anti-retaliation provision provides that “[n]o employer may 
discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly or indirectly, or in any other 
manner discriminate against, a whistleblower in the terms and conditions of 
employment because of any lawful act done by the whistleblower.”  15 U.S.C. § 78u-
6(h)(1)(A) (2014) (emphasis added). 
138.  Asadi, 720 F.3d at 626–27. 
139.  Id. at 627. 
140.  Id. 
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manager can state a claim under the Dodd-Frank 
whistleblower-protection provision because he was a 
“whistleblower” and suffered retaliation based on his disclosure 
to the CEO, which was protected under SOX.141 
The Fifth Circuit reasoned this hypothetical demonstrates that 
subsection (iii) of the anti-retaliation provision’s protected 
activities is not superfluous.142  Subsection (iii) protects an 
individual from retaliation who qualifies as a whistleblower under 
the whistleblower definition based on his other required or 
protected disclosure.143  The Fifth Circuit stated that Asadi’s 
construction would read the words “to the [SEC]” out of the 
whistleblower definition and violate the principles of statutory 
construction that every word must be given effect.144 
Finally, Asadi argued that the Fifth Circuit should defer to the 
SEC’s Rule, which extends anti-retaliation protection to an 
individual who provides information in accordance with the anti-
retaliation provision.145  However, the Fifth Circuit rejected this 
argument as well, stating that the SEC’s Rule redefines 
whistleblower more broadly than Congress intended.146  The SEC’s 
Rule provides that an individual can qualify as a whistleblower 
even though the individual does not make a disclosure to the SEC 
as long as the individual is engaged in one of the three protected 
activities listed in the anti-retaliation provision.147  The Fifth Circuit 
stated that the plain language of the Whistleblower Program does 
not support the SEC’s expanded definition of whistleblower since 
Congress unambiguously defined the term “whistleblower.”148 
The Whistleblower Program clearly expresses Congress’s 
intent that, to qualify as a whistleblower under the Dodd-Frank 
Act, an individual must make a disclosure to the SEC.149  Since 
Congress directly addressed who qualifies as a whistleblower, the 
Fifth Circuit determined that it must reject the SEC’s Rule 
expanding the definition of whistleblower.150  Therefore, the Fifth 
Circuit held that the anti-retaliation provision only provides 
141.  Id. at 627–28. 
142.  Id. at 628. 
143.  Id. 
144.  Id. at 629. 
145.  Id. 
146.  Id. at 629–30. 
147.  Id. at 629. 
148.  Id. at 630. 
149.  Id. 
150.  Id. 
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retaliation protection to an employee-whistleblower who makes a 
disclosure to the SEC.151 
Furthering the argument that, in order to receive protection 
under the anti-retaliation provision an individual must first qualify 
as a whistleblower under the whistleblower definition, the district 
courts in California and Florida looked at the anti-retaliation 
provision’s section heading—”Protection of Whistleblowers.”152  
These district courts acknowledged that while a section heading 
“cannot limit the plain meaning of the text,” the section heading 
could lend support to the conclusion that the anti-retaliation 
provision only protects an individual who qualifies as a 
whistleblower under the whistleblower definition.153 
2.  Majority View: The Anti-Retaliation Provision is 
Ambiguous and Should be Construed to Also Protect 
Employee-Whistleblowers Who Only Make Internal 
Reports 
In deciding whether subsection (iii) of the anti-retaliation 
provision’s protected activities is intended to also protect an 
employee-whistleblower who makes only an internal report to his 
employer, the Second Circuit and majority of district courts take 
one of two approaches.  The Second Circuit and district courts in 
California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York 
utilize the first approach, the Chevron154 deference test,155 which is 
151.  Id. 
152. Englehart v. Career Educ. Corp., No. 8:14-cv-444-T-33EAJ, 2014 WL 
2619501, at *1, *8 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2014); Banko v. Apple, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749, 
757 (N.D. Cal. 2013); see 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2014). 
153. Englehart, 2014 WL 2619501, at *8 (quoting Florida Dep’t of Revenue v. 
Picadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 47 (2008)); Banko, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 757. 
154. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984). 
155. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, No. 14-4626, 2015 WL 5254916, at *1, *9 (2d 
Cir. Sept. 10, 2015) (stating that the court need not resolve the ambiguity itself and will 
defer to the SEC’s reasonable interpretation); Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., No. C-
14-5180 EMC, 2015 WL 4483955, at *1, *12 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2015) (finding that the 
SEC’s Rule is a reasonable interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision and entitled 
to deference); Connolly v. Remkes, No. 5:14-CV-01344-LHK, 2014 WL 5473144, at *1, 
*6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014) (finding that the whistleblower definition is ambiguous and 
the SEC’s Rule is reasonable and warrants deference); Yang v. Navigators Grp., Inc., 
18 F. Supp. 3d 519, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding that the whistleblower definition and 
the anti-retaliation provision, when read in conjunction with each other, create a 
potential conflict and the SEC’s Rule is a reasonable reading that resolves the 
ambiguity); Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., No. 13-4149 (SDW)(MCA), slip 
op. 1, 6 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2014) (giving deference to the SEC’s Rule since it “harmonizes 
the contradictory provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act while not rendering any word or 
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the same approach used by the Fifth Circuit and the minority of 
courts.156  Under this approach, if there is ambiguity between the 
whistleblower definition and subsection (iii), and the SEC’s Rule is 
a reasonable interpretation, a court must defer to it.157  Under the 
second approach, district courts in Colorado, Nebraska, New York, 
and Tennessee have determined that, by its own terms, subsection 
(iii) does not require interaction directly with the SEC and 
provides retaliation protection to an employee-whistleblower who 
makes an internal disclosure required or protected by certain laws 
within the SEC’s jurisdiction.158 
a. First approach: Chevron deference 
The first step of the Chevron deference test is to determine if 
the Whistleblower Program is ambiguous.159  According to its 
terms, subsection (iii) of the anti-retaliation provision prohibits an 
section superfluous”); Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters (Mkts.) LLC, 984 F. Supp. 2d 
141, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (giving the SEC’s Rule deference since the Whistleblower 
Program is ambiguous and there is conflict in a narrow reading requiring disclosure to 
the SEC when read in conjunction with subsection (iii) of the anti-retaliation provision, 
which does not require reporting to the SEC); Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 977 F. Supp. 
2d 42, 45 (D. Mass. 2013) (adopting the SEC’s interpretation of the Whistleblower 
Program to provide anti-retaliation protection to an individual who only makes an 
internal report); Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5914(JMF), 2013 WL 2190084, 
at *1, *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013) (deferring to the SEC’s interpretation because the 
SEC’s Rule clarifies an ambiguity in the Whistleblower Program); Kramer v. Trans-
Lux Corp., No. 3:11cv1424 (SRU), 2012 WL 4444820, at *1, *4–*5 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 
2012) (finding that the Whistleblower Program is ambiguous and the SEC’s Rule 
should be given deference since it is a reasonable interpretation).  See supra Part II.C.1 
and text accompanying notes 110–122 for a discussion of statutory construction and the 
Chevron deference two-step analysis. 
156.  See supra Part II.C.1. 
157. Rosenblum, 984 F. Supp. at 147–48. 
158. Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719, 732–33 (D. Neb. 2014) 
(declining to give the SEC’s Rule deference, since a plain reading of the Whistleblower 
Provision shows that an internal reporter is also protected under the anti-retaliation 
provision, even though the internal reporter would not qualify for a bounty under the 
bounty provision); Genberg v. Porter, 935 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1106 (D. Colo. 2013) 
(stating that there is conflict between the whistleblower definition and the third 
subsection of the anti-retaliation provision and that the third subsection should be read 
as an exception to the whistleblower definition); Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 
852 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (M.D. Tenn. 2012) (harmonizing the whistleblower definition 
and the third subsection of protected activity in the anti-retaliation provision to 
demonstrate that an internal reporter is protected so long as the disclosure relates to a 
violation of the securities laws); Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202(LBS), 
2011 WL 1672066, at *1, *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011) (contradicting provisions of the 
Whistleblower Program are best read so that subsection (iii) of the anti-retaliation 
provision is an exception to the whistleblower definition). 
159. Banko v. Apple Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749, 755 (N.D. Cal. 2013).  See supra 
Part II.C.1 for an expanded explanation of the Chevron deference test. 
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employer from retaliating against a whistleblower for taking certain 
protected actions under SOX, which does not require disclosure to 
the SEC,160 while whistleblower is defined as an individual who 
reports a securities law violation to the SEC.161  Based on a reading 
of these provisions, ambiguity arises as subsection (iii) 
“contemplates a broader scope of protection.”162 
Courts utilizing the Chevron deference approach acknowledge 
that the Fifth Circuit has read these provisions as the whistleblower 
definition defining who is protected and subsections (i)-(iii) of the 
anti-retaliation provision’s protected activities as identifying what a 
whistleblower is protected from doing.163  However, while “this 
reading of the two statutory provisions is permissible . . . it is by no 
means mandatory.”164  These courts have determined that 
subsection (iii) can also be viewed as an exception to the 
whistleblower definition.165  The existence of these “competing, 
plausible interpretations . . . compels the conclusion that the 
statutory text is ambiguous in conveying Congress’s intent.”166  
Thus, when the whistleblower definition is read alongside 
subsection (iii) of the anti-retaliation provision’s protected 
activities, there is ambiguity regarding who subsection (iii) 
protects.167 
The second step of the Chevron deference test is to apply the 
Chevron deference two-step analysis.  First, a court must consider 
whether Congress has spoken directly on the issue, and if so, must 
give effect to Congress’ expressed intent.168  However, if Congress 
is silent on the specific issue, then a court must determine if the 
agency’s interpretation is a “permissible construction of the 
statute”.169  If the agency’s interpretation is reasonable, a court 
160. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) (2014).  One provision of SOX requires 
companies to establish policies and procedures for an employee to anonymously 
disclose instances of misconduct to the board of directors.  See also 15 U.S.C. § 78j-
1(m)(4)(B) (2014); Baynes, supra note 44, at 877–880. 
161.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2014). 
162. Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5914(JMF), 2013 WL 2190084, at 
*1,*4 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013). 
163.  Id. 
164.  Id. at *5. 
165.  Id. 
166.  Id. (citation omitted). 
167.  Yang v. Navigators Grp., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 519, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
168.  Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., No. C-14-5180 EMC, 2015 WL 4483955, at 
*1, *5 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2015); Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters (Mkts.) LLC, 984 F. 
Supp. 2d 141, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
169. Somers, 2015 WL 4483955, at *5 (citation omitted); Rosenblum, 984 F. 
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must defer to it and cannot substitute its own interpretation of the 
statute, even if the court believes a different reading is necessary.170 
In applying the first step of the Chevron deference two-step 
analysis, a review of the legislative history indicates that subsection 
(iii) of the anti-retaliation provision was only added to the last 
version of the Dodd-Frank Act that was passed and there is no 
record that Congress even discussed subsection (iii) during its 
sessions.171  Therefore, since Congress has not spoken on the issue 
and its intent cannot be discerned, step two of the Chevron 
deference two-step analysis requires a court to defer to the SEC’s 
Rule as long as it is a reasonable construction. 
The SEC’s Rule is in line with two cardinal rules of statutory 
construction.172  First, the SEC’s Rule is consistent with the 
superfluous cannon that a statute ought to be construed so that “no 
clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or 
insignificant.”173  Second, the Rule is consistent with the 
harmonious-reading cannon that a court should “interpret [a] 
statute as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme, and fit, if 
possible, all parts into a harmonious whole.”174  While a statutory 
definition is a strong indicator of a term’s defined meaning, the 
definition can be contradicted by other indications.175  In fact, a 
recent Supreme Court case reasoned that, in determining the fair 
reading of a statute, a general definition does not necessarily 
constituted a clear statement of what Congress meant and other 
factors can be considered in order to harmonize the meaning of a 
statute.176 
Supp. 2d at 147 (citation omitted). 
170.  Somers, 2015 WL 4483955, at *5; Rosenblum, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 147. 
171.  Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, No. 14-4626, 2015 WL 5254916, at *1, *7 (2d 
Cir. Sept. 10, 2015); Somers, 2015 WL 4483955, at *11. 
172.  Somers, 2015 WL 4483955, at *6. 
173.  Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5914(JMF), 2013 WL 2190084, at *1, 
*5 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2014) (citation omitted); Somers, 2015 WL 4483955, at *6. 
174.  Somers, 2015 WL 4483955, at *6 (citation omitted). 
175.  Berman, 2015 WL 5254916, at *8; Somers, 2015 WL 4483955, at *7. 
176.  Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2090–91 (2014).  Bond discovered 
that her best friend was pregnant with her husband’s child.  Id. at 2085.  Bond, seeking 
revenge on her friend, ordered two toxic chemicals on Amazon.com.  Id.  On over 20 
different occasions, Bond spread the chemicals on her friend’s car door, mailbox, and 
doorknob.  Id.  On one occasion, her friend came in contact with the chemicals, which 
resulted in a minor burn on her friend’s thumb that was easily treated by rinsing it with 
water.  Id.  Bond was charged with two counts of possessing and using a chemical 
weapon under the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 (the 
“Act”).  Id. at 2083, 2085.  She entered a conditional guilty plea and was sentenced to 
six years in federal prison, five years of supervised released, and ordered to pay a 
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Tension arises since the whistleblower definition requires an 
individual to provide information to the SEC177 and subsection (iii) 
of the anti-retaliation provision’s protected activities provides 
protection to an individual who makes a SOX disclosure that is not 
required to be reported to the SEC.178  In its comments to its Rule, 
the SEC explained that the anti-retaliation provision protects 
“three different categories of whistleblowers, and the third 
category . . . includes individuals who report to persons and 
governmental authorities other than the [SEC].”179  Accordingly, 
the SEC recognizes subsection (iii) of the anti-retaliation 
provision’s protected activities as an exception to the whistleblower 
definition and affords retaliation protection to employee-
whistleblowers who make internal disclosures to their employers.180  
In promulgating its Rule, the “SEC considered the policy issues 
involved and exercised judgment in formulating its final rule” the 
purpose of which was to “better achieve the goals of the 
[Whistleblower Program] and advance effective enforcement of the 
Federal securities laws.”181  The SEC’s Rule clarifies an ambiguity 
in a statute in which the SEC was charged with promulgating rules 
in order to interpret and enforce the statute.182  Further, the SEC 
has experience and expertise, acquired over time, in interpreting 
and enforcing securities laws.183  Therefore, a court should defer to 
the SEC’s reasonable interpretation of the Whistleblower 
$2,000 fine and almost $10,000 in restitution.  Id. at 2086.  The Tenth Circuit affirmed 
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.  Id.  The Supreme Court reserved Bond’s 
conviction and remanded in part because the defined term “chemical weapon” was 
being too broadly interpreted and intruded on the States’ police power.  Id. at 2090, 
2094.  The Supreme Court gave the example that, if placed in the city’s water supply, 
the chemicals Bond used may be considered chemical weapons; however, Bond’s 
actions were much less severe and allowing a conviction under the Act would give the 
statute a reach that exceeded the ordinary meaning of the words Congress used.  Id. at 
2091. 
177.  Somers, 2015 WL 4483955, at *7; 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2014). 
178.  Somers, 2015 WL 2354807, at *7; see supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
179.  Yang v. Navigators Grp., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 519, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
180.  Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5914(JMF), 2013 WL 2190084, at *1, 
*5 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013). 
181.  Id. at *6 (citation omitted). 
182.  Id. at *7.  In fact, “the SEC is clearly the agency to resolve the ambiguity we 
face.”  Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, No. 14-4626, 2015 WL 5254916, at *1, *9 (2d Cir. 
Sept. 10, 2015). 
183. Murray, 2013 WL 2190084, at *7.  The Supreme Court has “long recognized 
that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department’s construction 
of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to 
administrative interpretations.”  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
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Program.184 
b. Second approach: on its face, the anti-retaliation provision 
protects employee-whistleblowers 
District courts in Colorado, Nebraska, New York, and 
Tennessee utilize the second approach and have determined that, 
by their own terms, subsections (i) and (ii) of the anti-retaliation 
provision’s protected activities provide protection to an individual 
who makes a report to the SEC or who works with the SEC 
concerning potential securities law violations.185  On the other 
hand, subsection (iii) does not require interaction directly with the 
SEC and provides protection for an employee-whistleblower who 
makes disclosures required under SOX or pursuant to another rule 
or regulation subject to the SEC’s jurisdiction.186 
Simply put, if an employee was required to report a potential 
securities law violation through his employer’s internal 
whistleblowing procedures or an employee’s disclosure was 
protected by another federal agency or by federal law enforcement, 
then subsection (iii) of the anti-retaliation provision’s protected 
activities would prohibit retaliation against that employee-
whistleblower by his employer.187  In this respect, subsection (iii) is 
seen as a catch-all provision to extend retaliation protection to an 
employee-whistleblower who makes a disclosure under any law, 
rule, or regulation that is subject to the SEC’s jurisdiction.188 
Further, under traditional statutory construction principles, a 
court must give reasonable meaning to the words of a statute 
without rendering any language superfluous.189  By reading the 
whistleblower definition, which requires reporting to the SEC, 
verbatim, it “would effectively invalidate [subsection] (iii)’s 
protection of whistleblower disclosures that do not require 
reporting to the SEC.”190  Therefore, a court must read subsection 
(iii) together with the whistleblower definition to protect an 
employee-whistleblower who reports a possible securities law 
violation internally to his employer or externally to non-SEC 
184.  Murray, 2013 WL 2190084, at *5, *7. 
185.  Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986, 993 (M.D. Tenn. 
2012). 
186.  Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) (2014). 
187.  Nollner, 852 F. Supp. 2d at 994. 
188.  Id. 
189.  Id. (citation omitted). 
190.  Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202(LBS), 2011 WL 1672066, at 
*1, *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011). 
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persons.191 
c. SEC’s Amicus Curiae Briefs 
The SEC has submitted amicus curiae briefs in Second Circuit 
and Third Circuit cases to support its interpretation of the anti-
retaliation provision.192  In its briefs, the SEC recognized that there 
is ambiguity between subsection (iii) of the anti-retaliation 
provision’s protected activities, which lists protected 
whistleblowing activities that do not require reporting to the SEC 
(by referring to SOX and other non-SEC originated rules that are 
also subject to the SEC’s jurisdiction), and the whistleblower 
definition.193  A whistleblower is an “individual who provides . . . 
information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the 
[SEC], in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the 
[SEC].”194  The SEC noted that subsections (i) and (ii) of the anti-
retaliation provision’s protected activities protect whistleblowers 
who report information directly to the SEC or participate with the 
SEC in an investigation, whereas subsection (iii) goes beyond 
disclosures involving securities law violations and disclosure made 
to the SEC.195 
The SEC acknowledged that if the whistleblower definition 
was read narrowly as a limitation on the application of subsection 
(iii), then two preconditions would need to be met in order for a 
whistleblower to be protected under subsection (iii): first, the 
whistleblower made a concurrent disclosure to the SEC, and 
second, the information involved a violation of the securities 
laws.196  The SEC questioned this reading because “[i]f Congress 
had actually intended to protect only these ‘required or protected’ 
191.  Nollner, 852 F. Supp. 2d at 994. 
192. Safarian Brief, supra note 30, at 1; Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 31, at 1; see 
supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text for background on the Second Circuit and 
Third Circuit cases. 
193.  Safarian Brief, supra note 30, at 18, Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 30, at 18–20.  
As written, subsection (iii) also provides protection to an employee who makes a 
disclosure to a public company audit committee regarding questionable accounting 
practices, which includes practices that may not rise to the level of a securities law 
violation, and an in-house attorney’s duty under SOX to disclose a breach of the Chief 
Executive Officer’s fiduciary duty.  Safarian Brief, supra note 30, at 19. 
194.  Safarian Brief, supra note 30, at 18; Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 30, at 18–20; 
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2014). 
195. Safarian Brief, supra note 30, at 19; Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 30, at 18–20; 
see 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) (2014); see also supra note 193 and accompanying 
text. 
196.  Safarian Brief, supra note 30, at 20. 
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disclosures that satisfy these two conditions, why would Congress 
craft [subsection] (iii) to unnecessarily suggest that it protects a 
much broader class of disclosures than it actually does?”197  If 
Congress truly intended this outcome, it could have been more 
explicit that subsection (iii) only intended to protect disclosures of 
securities law violations and only if the whistleblower made a 
concurrent disclosure to the SEC.198  Furthermore, subsection (iii) 
would be redundant in instances where the employer knows the 
whistleblower also made a concurrent disclosure to the SEC as 
subsections (i) and (ii) would already provide retaliation protection 
for the whistleblower who reports securities law violations to the 
SEC.199 
The only other instance in which this construction of 
subsection (iii) may function is under the hypothetical posed by the 
Fifth Circuit in Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C.200  While the 
Fifth Circuit reasoned that this hypothetical prevents subsection 
(iii) from being superfluous, that is far from true.201  The SEC 
stated that the anti-retaliation provision is intended to prevent 
retaliation by putting an employer on notice that it cannot retaliate 
against its employees.202  By following the Fifth Circuit’s approach, 
subsection (iii) would be ineffective to prevent retaliation and 
would lose its deterrent effect on employers because an employer 
would not know that the employee-whistleblower made an external 
report to the SEC.203 
The interplay between the statutory provisions demonstrates 
that Congress did not unambiguously express its intent to limit the 
protections contained in the anti-retaliation provision to only 
whistleblowers who report securities law violations to the SEC.204  
By reaching the contrary conclusion, the Fifth Circuit failed to 
consider the role the Whistleblower Program “occupies within the 
broader securities-law framework, particularly the internal 
reporting processes that Congress has previously established,”205 
197.  Id. 
198.  Id. at 20–21. 
199.  Id. at 21; Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 30, at 20–21. 
200. Safarian Brief, supra note 30, at 22; Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 30, at 22; 
Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 627–28 (5th Cir. 2013).  See supra p. 
21–22 for the text of the hypothetical posed by the Fifth Circuit in Asadi. 
201.  Safarian Brief, supra note 30, at 22. 
202.  Id.; Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 30, at 22. 
203.  Safarian Brief, supra note 30, at 22; Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 30, at 22–23. 
204.  Safarian Brief, supra note 30, at 23. 
205.  Id. at 24. 
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whereas the SEC acknowledges and interprets the Whistleblower 
Program against the broader securities-law framework.206 
Further, the SEC acknowledged the Fifth Circuit’s erroneous 
belief that its interpretation was necessary in order to avoid 
abolishing SOX whistleblower protection because it was unlikely a 
whistleblower would raise a SOX anti-retaliation claim if the 
whistleblower could raise a Dodd-Frank Act anti-retaliation 
claim.207  However, this ignores two advantages of a SOX anti-
retaliation claim.208  First, an individual could avoid the burdens of 
pursuing his claim in court, which would likely result in high 
litigation costs, having his claim heard in an administrative forum, 
and having the DoL assume responsibility for the investigation.209  
Second, an individual with nominal back pay damages but 
significant emotional injuries may receive an even greater recovery, 
because a SOX claim allows recovery for emotional distress and 
reputational harm.210  These advantages demonstrate that SOX 
anti-retaliation protection is not effectively abolished by the SEC’s 
interpretation of the Dodd-Frank Act’s anti-retaliation provision. 
Since there is ambiguity between the whistleblower definition 
and subsection (iii) of the anti-retaliation provision, the SEC’s 
reasonable interpretation that the anti-retaliation provision 
protects three different types of protected activities and that 
subsection (iii) protects an employee-whistleblower who reports to 
someone other than to the SEC warrants deference.211  The SEC 
stated that its interpretation is reasonable since “[a] contrary result 
. . . would significantly weaken the deterrence effect on employers 
who might otherwise consider taking an adverse employment 
action.”212  Further, its interpretation is reasonable because it 
resolves the statutory ambiguity in a way that provides broad 
retaliation protection in the manner the anti-retaliation provision 
contemplated; ensures an employee-whistleblower who reports 
internally first will not be disadvantaged by losing employment 
retaliation protection; and better supports the overall objective of 
206.  Id. 
207. Id.; Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 30, at 20.  A Dodd-Frank Act anti-
retaliation claim allows for recovery of two times back pay rather than only back pay 
under a SOX anti-retaliation claim and has a substantially longer statute of limitations.  
Safarian Brief, supra note 30, at 24. 
208.  Safarian Brief, supra note 30, at 25. 
209.  Id. 
210.  Id. 
211.  Id. at 26; Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 30, at 27–28. 
212.  Safarian Brief, supra note 30, at 29; Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 30, at 29. 
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the Whistleblower Program and the SEC’s rulemaking—mainly, 
not to dis-incentivize a potential employee-whistleblower from first 
making an internal report.213 
III. CONFIDENTIALITY AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS, 
COMPANY SELF-REPORTING, EMPLOYEE LOYALTY, AND PUBLIC 
POLICY: CONSIDERATIONS AND BENEFITS 
A. Confidentiality and Ethical Considerations of Corporate 
Officers and Employees Holding Professional Designations 
Corporate officers and corporate accounting and finance 
employees, such as certified public accountants (“CPAs”) and 
chartered financial analysts (“CFAs”), have an advantage over 
regulators in monitoring a company’s compliance with the 
securities laws as these employees have access to confidential and 
proprietary company information and have the requisite 
knowledge of the company and its methods of conducting 
business.214  These employees have the technical skills necessary to 
understand the complex financial transactions and a unique ability 
to recognize when corporate actions violate the securities laws.215  
In addition, such employees are agents for the companies in which 
they work and owe certain fiduciary duties to the company.216 
Corporate officers and corporate accounting and finance 
employees owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to their respective 
employers, must act in good faith, must act in the best interests of 
their employer, and must protect company information.217  
Additionally, CPAs and CFAs are part of professional 
organizations that require their members to adhere to certain 
confidentiality and ethical obligations, including the obligation to 
act in the best interests of their employer and/or client.218  Such 
confidentiality and ethical obligations can, by their very nature, 
213.  Safarian Brief, supra note 30, at 28; Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 30, at 28–29. 
214.  Moberly, supra note 45, at 1116–17; Baynes, supra note 44, at 884. 
215.  Moberly, supra note 45, at 1116–17; Rapp, supra note 46, at 109. 
216.  Baynes, supra note 44.  Officers and senior executives owe a duty of loyalty 
and a duty of care to their employer.  Id. at 883–86.  The duty of loyalty involves acting 
in good faith and in a manner reasonably believed to be in the best interests of the 
company, which includes protecting company information.  Id. at 883.  The duty of care 
involves performing duties with the care that a person in a similar “position would 
reasonably exercise under similar circumstances.”  Id. at 886. 
217.  Id. at 883. 
218. See Code of Ethics & Standards of Professional Conduct, supra note 44; 
AICPA Code of Professional Conduct, supra note 44. 
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conflict with internal whistleblowing policies and procedures and 
external whistleblowing programs.219 
These employees may be found to have converted company 
information by sharing such information with external 
authorities.220  At worst, these external disclosures could lead to 
civil or criminal liability for the company, senior officers, and the 
board of directors, and may make it impossible for them to receive 
reduced sanctions and fines.221  At the very least, these external 
disclosures could lead to embarrassment or reputational loss for the 
company and the corporate officers.222 
CFAs have similar difficulties.  If a CFA discovers that his 
company or another employee has committed a securities law 
violation, the CFA has a duty not to participate or assist in the 
misconduct and to act in the best interest of his client/employer, 
which may include disclosing the misconduct in order to prevent 
further harm.223  The CFA may have an inherent conflict with his 
ethical obligations if he fears retaliation by his employer for 
reporting the possible violation internally through his employer’s 
whistleblowing procedures and chooses to report the possible 
violation externally to the SEC.224 
The CFA Institute has enumerated certain steps a CFA should 
take in order to avoid ethical violations and stop misconduct from 
occurring or continuing to occur.225  These steps include discussing 
concerns with the individual committing the misconduct to allow 
the individual time to correct the situation; notifying the employer 
through the employer’s internal procedures; asking to be removed 
from the situation where the misconduct is occurring; reporting the 
misconduct to the appropriate outside regulator; and resigning 
from the company if continued employment might be construed as 
participation in the misconduct.226  While these steps may assist a 
CFA in avoiding disciplinary actions initiated by the CFA Institute, 
they do nothing to protect a CFA from retaliation by his employer 
for reporting a violation internally.  In fact, the CFA Institute 
219.  See Baynes, supra note 44, at 885. 
220.  See id. 
221.  See id. 
222.  See id. at 886. 
223. See Code of Ethics & Standards of Professional Conduct, supra note 44; 
What Makes a True CFA Charterholder, CFA MAG. 34 (Jan.–Feb. 2011), 
http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/10.2469/cfm.v22.n1.full. 
224.  What Makes a True CFA Charterholder, supra note 223. 
225.  Id. 
226.  Id. 
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encourages a CFA to take actions (e.g., making an internal report) 
that potentially may not be protected under the Fifth Circuit’s 
reading of the Dodd-Frank Act’s anti-retaliation provision. 
Under the Fifth Circuit’s reading, if a CFA made an internal 
report of a possible securities law violation to his employer and his 
employer retaliated against him for that internal report, the CFA 
would not be protected under subsection (iii) of the anti-retaliation 
provision.227  According to the Fifth Circuit, the CFA would not be 
considered a whistleblower under the whistleblower definition 
because he did not make his report to the SEC.228  Thus, any 
retaliation faced by the CFA by virtue of his internal disclosure 
would go unpunished, even if the CFA subsequently made a report 
to the SEC.229  At the time of future disclosure to the SEC, 
retaliation against the CFA would have already occurred.  Since 
that retaliation did not occur as a result of the CFA’s disclosure to 
the SEC, the CFA would not be protected under the Fifth Circuit’s 
interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision.  If the employer 
retaliated against the CFA for a second time, as a result of the 
CFA’s external report to the SEC, only then would the CFA have 
any protection from retaliation under the Fifth Circuit’s 
interpretation and that protection would be limited to the 
retaliation directly resulting from the CFA’s disclosure to the SEC. 
Such an outcome has a chilling effect on those employees who 
are charged with independently confirming their employer’s 
compliance with the securities laws.  The Fifth Circuit’s 
interpretation provides timid anti-retaliation protection that may 
come too late in many instances.  It may even encourage retaliation 
against employee-whistleblowers who only make internal reports in 
the first instance, because any retaliation by the employer against 
these employee-whistleblowers would not be subject to the anti-
retaliation provision’s protection. 
B. Company Incentives to Self-Report Violations 
As regulators’ primary focus has shifted away from 
punishment of a company towards the cessation of wrongdoing, 
227.  See supra Part II.C.1. 
228.  See supra Part II.C.1. 
229. The CFA’s delay in reporting the potential securities law violation to the 
SEC is a direct consequence of the CFA Institute’s enumerated steps to avoid ethical 
violations and disciplinary actions initiated by the CFA Institute.  See What Makes a 
True CFA Charterholder, supra note 223. 
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public support of internal whistleblowing has grown.230  
Whistleblowing has been embraced as a “tool to reduce, deter and 
stop corporate wrongdoing.”231  Regulators often “enlist private 
corporations to self-regulate actively by self-identifying problems 
and risks.”232  New regulations rely on individual companies to 
monitor their compliance with the securities laws and to 
continuously learn about industry best practices.233 
These new regulations and “judicial decisions . . . encourage 
employers to establish internal whistleblowing procedures in order 
to reap the benefits that these reports can deliver to organizations 
and the government.  Direct incentives for creating internal 
[whistleblowing] procedures are included in congressional 
mandates such as the federal Corporate Sentencing Guidelines.”234  
The Corporate Sentencing Guidelines specifically recommend 
internal whistleblowing as a way to deter misconduct by providing 
for increased monetary fines and sanctions for companies that 
make little to no effort to prevent wrongdoing.235  Companies that, 
in good faith, attempt to stop and detect misconduct often receive 
reduced fines and sanctions.236  Meaningful internal reporting 
systems and protecting whistleblowers are some of the 
characteristics of an acceptable detection program.237  These 
internal reporting systems allow for early detection of issues and 
give the company time to respond before misconduct can fester and 
expose the company to substantial liabilities.238 
Internal reporting saves public funds by reducing the costs 
associated with investigations and enforcement actions initiated by 
the SEC, other regulatory agencies, and law enforcement; is in line 
with most employees’ preference to internally report possible 
violations; is less harmful to the company; and is seen as more 
ethical as external reporting is often perceived as disloyal.239  
230.  Dworkin, supra note 42. 
231.  Callahan et al., supra note 41, at 215. 
232.  Lobel, supra note 43, at 1247. 
233.  Id. at 1248. 
234.  Callahan et al., supra note 41, at 190. 
235.  Id. at 191. 
236.  Id. 
237.  Id. 
238. Letter from Susan Hackett, Senior Vice President and Gen. Couns., Ass’n 
of Corp. Couns., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 15, 2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-126.pdf [http://perma.cc/TLK9-XFWQ]. 
239. Dworkin, supra note 42; Bishara, et al., supra note 40, at 39.  “Governments, 
strapped for resources, facing shrinking budgets, global competitive pressures to 
liberalize trade, and corporate regulatory resistance, are increasingly experimenting 
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Internal whistleblowing procedures provide an efficient and 
inexpensive source of information on possible corporate 
misconduct; assist in communicating information to those who have 
the power to act; and assist in correcting “misunderstandings and 
wrongdoing without the financial and reputational risks associated 
with external” whistleblowing.240 
The Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the anti-retaliation 
provision241 would frustrate these company incentives and conflict 
with other statutes and regulations, such as SOX, which encourages 
internal reporting because employee-whistleblowers would be 
forced to simultaneously report possible misconduct to the SEC to 
preserve protection under the Dodd-Frank Act’s anti-retaliation 
provision.  If this were to happen, company whistleblowing 
procedures would be meaningless and most likely go unused.  
Additionally, companies would not receive the benefits associated 
with early detection of potential misconduct, resulting in more 
harm to the company, its clients, and investors. 
C. Employee Whistleblowing and Loyalty 
Whistleblowers are rarely seen in a positive light.  In fact, 
“[t]he history of whistleblowers[]. . . [is that most]  have been fired, 
blackballed from their industry or profession, and have suffered 
personal problems.”242  Fellow employees generally view 
whistleblowers as disloyal and treat them as outcasts.243  
Nevertheless, “a deep sense of institutional loyalty (as well as fear 
of retribution for blowing the whistle) lies within the heart of most 
employees . . . .”244 
The regulatory environment is based on the assumption that 
regulators will detect instances of misconduct.245  However, a study 
of corporate scandals found that the SEC detected only seven 
with approaches that rely on organizations themselves to complement standard-setting 
and enforcement activities.”  Lobel, supra note 43, at 1267. 
240. Bishara, et al., supra note 40.  “External whistleblowers can disclose 
confidential information or inaccurate information that hurts the company’s business.”  
Elizabeth C. Tippett, The Promise of Compelled Whistleblowing: What the Corporate 
Governance Provisions of the Sarbanes Oxley Mean for Employment Law, 11 EMP. 
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 1, 22 (2007). 
241.  See supra Part III.C.1. 
242. David Culp, Whistleblowers: Corporate Anarchists or Heros? Towards a 
Judicial Perspective, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 109, 113 (1995) (all but first alteration in 
original) (citation omitted). 
243.  Id. at 114. 
244.  Id. at 115. 
245.  Rapp, supra note 46, at 109. 
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percent of the corporate fraud.246  This suggests that 
“[w]histleblowing is the single most effective way to detect fraud” 
and “[e]mployee disclosures are the most common source of fraud 
detection.”247  In fact, whistleblower tips account for more than 
forty percent of fraud detection.248  Without employee-
whistleblowers, future incidents of large-scale corporate 
wrongdoing, as large as Enron249 or Bernie Madoff,250 might be 
revealed too late by regulators or might never be revealed.251 
Other studies suggest that companies with internal 
whistleblowing procedures receive an increased number of 
whistleblower reports.252  One reason for this increase is that 
employees feel loyal to their employers and choose to report 
possible violations internally through their employers’ internal 
procedures in the first instance.253  Internal whistleblowers tend to 
be long-term employees with the requisite institutional knowledge 
who are disappointed by corporate misconduct and believe their 
employers’ best interests are served by reporting corporate 
misconduct internally.254  It is only when these loyal employee-
whistleblowers receive no response from their employers, fear 
retaliation, or suffer from retaliation that they choose to disclose 
misconduct externally,255 at which point it may already be too late 
246. Id.  The study was conducted by Alexander Dyck, an economist at the 
University of Toronto, and looked at 216 instances of corporate fraud occurring 
between 1996 and 2004 in United States companies with over $750 million in assets.  Id. 
at 107 n.254. 
247.  Id. at 108. 
248.  Id. 
249.  See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
250. Bernie Madoff, a former hedge fund manager, perpetrated what is thought 
to be the largest Ponzi scheme in history by taking nearly $50 billion from investors.  
Robert Lenzer, Bernie Madoff’s $50 Billion Ponzi Scheme, FORBES (Dec. 12, 2008, 
6:45 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2008/12/12/madoff-ponzi-hedge-pf-ii-
in_rl_1212croesus_inl.html [http://perma.cc/Q8KU-WBYQ?type=live].  He perpetrated 
his fraud by promising investors steady double-digit returns.  Id.  If Madoff’s investors 
had not requested $7 billion in redemptions, his scheme may never have been 
discovered.  Id.  In fact, the SEC failed to discover Madoff’s fraud, even after receiving 
several detailed and creditable complaints and failing to properly examine his activities.  
Jennifer Liberto, SEC investigation: We missed Madoff, CNNMONEY (Sept. 2, 2009, 
8:52 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2009/09/02/news/economy/Madoff_SEC_investigation/ 
[http://perma.cc/353R-H6BL]. 
251.  Rapp, supra note 46, at 109. 
252.  Moberly, supra note 45, at 1141. 
253.  Id. 
254.  Id. at 1142. 
255. Callahan et al., supra note 41, at 195; Rapp, supra note 46, at 115–19.  In 
2014, the SEC made two whistleblower awards to employee-whistleblowers when their 
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for these employee-whistleblowers to receive retaliation protection 
under the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the anti-retaliation 
provision.256 
When a company is engaged in wrongdoing, the failure to 
protect employee-whistleblowers is synonymous with the law 
encouraging other employees to engage in wrongdoing and behave 
immorally.257  Responsible employers should encourage their 
employees to report misconduct by implementing and supporting 
internal whistleblowing procedures and providing retaliation 
protection.258  Such actions demonstrate the employers’ 
commitment to ethical behavior, and can improve employee 
morale when employees know they can put a stop to corporate 
misconduct.259 
Yet, in most instances, rather than being viewed as a hero or 
respected by their peers, whistleblowers tend to be “treated with 
scorn and disdain and are often rewarded with labels such as 
‘snitch,’ ‘rat,’ and ‘tattle-tale.’”260  Recent studies have found that 
eighty-two percent of employee-whistleblowers reported being 
“fired, quit under duress, or had significantly altered [job] 
responsibilities,” and up to sixty-four percent have “reported being 
blacklisted from other jobs in their field.”261  When employee-
whistleblowers are adequately protected, they will internally report 
employers failed to act upon creditable allegations of corporate misconduct. 2014 
Annual Report, supra note 60, at 1.  In both instances, the employee-whistleblowers 
worked through their employers’ internal whistleblower procedures for reporting 
potential violations.  Id.  It was only when the employers failed to timely respond and 
take appropriate corrective action that the employee-whistleblowers made external 
reports to the SEC.  Id. 
256.  See supra Part II.C.1. 
257.  Culp, supra note 242, at 131. 
258. Id. at 132; see also Callahan, et al., supra note 41, at 196.  Organizational 
emphasis on internal procedures and procedural justice will likely enhance an 
employee’s willingness to follow corporate policies.  Lobel, supra note 43, at 1250.  
When internal reporting systems are communicated effectively to employees and 
proper training is received, the employer can assist in creating a culture of shared 
values where all employees feel responsible for making sure the company operates 
within the law and ethics.  Letter from Susan Hackett, Senior Vice President and Gen. 
Couns., Ass’n of Corp. Couns., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 2-3 (Dec. 15, 
2010), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-126.pdf [http://perma.cc/TLK9-
XFWQ].  However, these internal systems will not work if employees do not feel 
protected in reporting wrongdoing.  Id. 
259.  Callahan et al., supra note 41, at 196. 
260.  Culp, supra note 242, at 115. 
261. Rapp, supra note 46, at 113–14.  One whistleblower, a nuclear physicist, 
stated he was moved into a broom closet, his computer was taken, and he was 
eventually moved into the mailroom.  Id. 
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instances of misconduct before such misconduct can be detected 
externally.262  It is precisely for these reasons that employee-
whistleblowers are in the most need of retaliation protection. 
The Second Circuit and majority of courts’ interpretation of 
the anti-retaliation provision263 would protect these loyal employee-
whistleblowers from retaliation by their employers.  It would allow 
employee-whistleblowers to do what they perceive as morally right 
(i.e., report potential misconduct internally) in order to help 
protect the company and its reputation in the marketplace.  By not 
providing these employee-whistleblowers with retaliation 
protection, they will be forced to either make an external report to 
the SEC, in which case any company incentive for self-reporting 
misconduct would vanish,264 or choose to say nothing at all 
regarding the misconduct, thereby allowing the misconduct to 
continue. 
D. Public Policy Considerations 
In issuing its Rule, the SEC was determined to ensure that the 
Dodd-Frank Act’s Whistleblower Program would not undercut the 
willingness of an employee-whistleblower to report securities law 
violations through his employer’s internal whistleblowing 
procedures.265  The Whistleblower Program was designed to 
encourage internal whistleblower reports of potential misconduct 
rather than to weaken or replace internal compliance policies and 
procedures.266  Furthermore, its success relies on the protection of 
whistleblowers.267  While the Whistleblower Program provides 
262.  Dworkin, supra note 42, at 462. 
263.  See supra Part II.C.2. 
264.  See supra Part III.B. 
265. Safarian Brief, supra note 30, at 3; Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 30, at 2–3.  
“Recognizing the significant role that internal company reporting can play, Congress 
for nearly two decades has enacted a series of amendments to the securities laws to 
encourage, and in some instances to require, internal reporting of potential 
misconduct.”  Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 30, at 6.  In fact, the OWB is examining 
confidentiality, separation, and employment agreements to determine whether any 
provisions in those agreements may discourage employees from becoming 
whistleblowers.  Michael Sackheim, Seminar: Ethical Issues Confronting Lawyers in 
the Financial Services Industry in 2014, INT. SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, INC. 22 
(July 16, 2014) (on file with author) (citation omitted).  “[I]f [the OWB] find[s] that 
kind of language, not only [is the OWB] going to go to the companies, [it is] going to go 
after the lawyers who drafted it.”  Id. 
266.  2014 Annual Report, supra note 60, at 2. 
267. U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON 
THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 2 (2013), http://www.sec.gov/about/ 
offices/owb/annual-report-2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/X5QX-N22N].  The OWB is 
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incentives for whistleblowers to report possible misconduct (e.g., 
the possibility of a bounty), it also encourages employee-
whistleblowers to work within their respective employers’ own 
compliance policies and procedures.268  Refusing to provide 
retaliation protection to employee-whistleblowers who make 
internal reports in the first instance could cause the unintended 
consequence of employee-whistleblowers completely foregoing 
their employers’ internal compliance procedures and instead 
reporting directly to the SEC.269 
Congress, clearly appreciating the significant role that internal 
reporting can play, has enacted a number of amendments to the 
securities laws in order to encourage, and in some instances 
require, the internal reporting of possible misconduct.270  One 
challenge for the SEC during its rulemaking under the Dodd-Frank 
Act was to ensure employees were not dissuaded from reporting 
internally.271  Such a result could lead to a reduction in the 
effectiveness of employers’ existing compliance policies and 
procedures, and their ability to investigate and respond to possible 
misconduct.272 
Like Congress, the SEC recognizes that employee-
whistleblowing plays an important role in ensuring compliance with 
the federal securities laws and assists a company in identifying, 
correcting, and self-reporting violations, thereby critically 
enhancing its own enforcement objectives and its ability to bring 
enforcement actions against employers that retaliate against their 
employees for internal reporting.273  Internal reporting systems are 
essential sources of information regarding misconduct.274  If such 
internal reporting systems are not utilized, the system of securities 
regulation will be less effective.275  With this in mind, the SEC 
actively working with the Enforcement Division of the SEC to identify employers who 
have taken retaliatory actions against employees for reporting potential misconduct or 
instances where confidentiality, severance, or other agreements have been used to 
prohibit an employee from making reports regarding potential misconduct.  Id. 
268. Id. at 4. 
269.  Id. at 2. 
270.  Safarian Brief, supra note 30, at 5. 
271.  Id. at 10. 
272.  Id. 
273.  Id.; Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 30, at 5. 
274. Incentives for Whistleblowers, supra note 17, at 1836.  Without internal 
employee-whistleblower reports, future incidents of corporate wrongdoing, as large as 
Enron or the Bernie Madoff Ponzi scheme, may never be revealed or revealed too late.  
Rapp, supra note 46, at 109. 
275.  Incentives for Whistleblowers, supra note 17, at 1836. 
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issued its Rule to provide strong incentives for employee-
whistleblowers to report misconduct internally when appropriate.276 
In May of 2014, the Nebraska District Court, part of the 
majority position, decided Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC,277 in 
which the court specifically addressed the hypothetical posed by 
the Fifth Circuit in Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C.278  The 
Nebraska District Court explained that “[i]n the whistleblower 
context, there are three major players: employee-whistleblowers, 
employers, and the SEC.”279  From the employer’s point of view, 
the hypothetical posed in Asadi creates an odd standard of liability 
where liability for retaliation attaches only when certain 
preconditions, of which the employer is unaware, are satisfied.280  
The Nebraska District Court further explained that the 
hypothetical is also under-inclusive from the employee-
whistleblower’s point of view and over-inclusive from the SEC’s 
point of view, because the hypothetical fails to account for the fact 
that most employees tend to report violations internally to their 
employers before disclosing violations externally to the SEC.281 
Employees tend to report internally first for a number of reasons: 
they are not motivated by financial gain and the prospect of a 
bounty is not a factor in their decision; employees feel a sense of 
loyalty to their employers and want to give their employers a 
chance to correct the violation; and employees may not know to 
report externally to the SEC to receive retaliation protection.282 
The Nebraska District Court stated that “under Asadi, not 
only does the law fail to protect the majority of whistleblowers, it 
fails to protect those who are most vulnerable to retaliation.”283  
The court refused to attribute an intent to Congress that would 
offer broad retaliation protection only to take it away, leaving 
behind retaliation protection for only a small group of 
whistleblowers.284  It also refused to conclude that Congress 
intended to depart from the “general practice of first making an 
276.  Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 30, at 3. 
277.  20 F. Supp. 3d 719 (D. Neb. 2014). 
278.  720 F.3d 620, 627–28 (5th Cir. 2013).  See supra p. 21–22 for the text of the 
hypothetical posed by the Fifth Circuit in Asadi. 
279.  Bussing, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 732. 
280.  Id. 
281.  Id. 
282.  Id. at 732–33. 
283.  Id. at 733. 
284.  Id. 
42 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1 
internal report.”285 
The Nebraska District Court explained that internal reporting 
serves many important interests, such as allowing a company to 
remediate misconduct at an early stage and helping the SEC to vet 
the tips it receives.286  Failing to protect employee-whistleblowers 
who report internally will frustrate a company’s internal 
compliance procedures and might deter employees from 
participating in an internal investigation.287  “[F]rom the SEC’s 
perspective, the Asadi interpretation is over-inclusive, as it 
encourages reports to the SEC that could be more efficiently 
handled internally, thus wasting government resources generally 
and diverting resources from cases that need the SEC’s full 
attention.”288  While “Congress [may have] aimed to encourage 
whistleblowers to report to the SEC[,] . . . it does not follow that 
Congress intended to discourage internal reporting.”289 
Additionally, in supporting the majority position in Ellington 
v. Giacoumakis, the Massachusetts District Court stated: 
[i]t is apparent from the wording and positioning of § 78u-
6(h)(1)(B)(i)290 that Congress intended that an employee 
terminated for reporting [SOX] violations to a supervisor . . . 
and ultimately to the SEC, [to] have a private right of action 
under Dodd-Frank whether or not the employer wins the race 
to the SEC’s door with a termination notice.291 
Simply put, the Massachusetts District Court believed it unfair 
for an employee-whistleblower to lose retaliation protection under 
the Dodd-Frank Act after reporting a possible securities law 
violation internally first, if the employer is protected from its 
retaliation by firing the employee-whistleblower before the 
employee-whistleblower can make a subsequent report to the SEC, 
which is precisely the outcome that results from the Fifth Circuit’s 
interpretation. 
285.  Id. 
286.  Id. 
287.  Id. 
288.  Id. 
289.  Id. 
290.  “An individual who alleges discharge or other discrimination in violation of 
subparagraph (A) [the anti-retaliation provision] may bring an action under this 
subsection in the appropriate district court of the United States for the relief provided 
in subparagraph (C).”  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i) (2014). 
291.  977 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D. Mass. 2013). 
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CONCLUSION 
Internal whistleblowing is a useful tool for both companies and 
the SEC to combat violations of the securities laws.  Internal 
reporting procedures allow a company to detect corporate 
misconduct and self-report those violations to the SEC, which can 
result in reduced monetary fines and sanctions and can help to 
protect a company’s reputation in the marketplace.292  The SEC 
recognized the benefits of internal whistleblowing when it utilized 
its rulemaking authority under the Dodd-Frank Act.293  The SEC 
interpreted subsection (iii) of the anti-retaliation provision’s294 
protected activities as an exception to the whistleblower definition 
to provide retaliation protection to employee-whistleblowers who 
report possible securities law violations internally through their 
employers’ whistleblowing procedures, rather than only providing 
protection when employee-whistleblowers make external reports to 
the SEC.295 
Circuit courts of appeal and other district courts should reject 
the Fifth Circuit and minority of courts’ interpretation and follow 
the Second Circuit and majority of district courts to find that 
subsection (iii) provides anti-retaliation protection to employee-
whistleblowers who report possible securities law violations 
internally from the retaliatory actions of their employers.  By not 
protecting employee-whistleblowers who report internally, future 
circuit courts of appeal and district courts will impair the very 
purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act, which is “[t]o promote the 
financial stability of the United States by improving accountability 
and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail,’ to 
protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, [and] to protect 
consumers from abusive financial services practices . . . .”296  Failure 
to protect employee-whistleblowers who make internal reports of 
misconduct will only encourage retaliation against the group of 
individuals who need this protection the most.  Moreover, it is only 
fair and reasonable that these employee-whistleblowers receive 
adequate protection of the law when reporting its very violation. 
 
292.  Bishara et al., supra note 40, at 39–40; Callahan et al., supra note 41. 
293.  Meng-Lin Brief, supra note 30, at 6. 
294. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2 (West 2015), invalidated by Asadi v. G.E. Energy 
(USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013). 
295.  See supra Part II.C.3. 
296.  Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010) (codified 
in scattered sections of Titles 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, and 42 of the United States Code). 
